Potential Impact of Antiviral Drug Use during Influenza Pandemic by Gani, Raymond et al.
The recent spread of highly pathogenic strains of avian
influenza has highlighted the threat posed by pandemic
influenza. In the early phases of a pandemic, the only treat-
ment available would be neuraminidase inhibitors, which
many countries are considering stockpiling for pandemic
use. We estimate the effect on hospitalization rates of using
different antiviral stockpile sizes to treat infection. We esti-
mate that stockpiles that cover 20%–25% of the population
would be sufficient to treat most of the clinical cases and
could lead to 50% to 77% reductions in hospitalizations.
Substantial reductions in hospitalization could be achieved
with smaller antiviral stockpiles if drugs are reserved for
persons at high risk.
R
ecent outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza
in poultry in East Asia (H5N1), Canada (H7N3), and
the Netherlands (H7N7), and their subsequent transmis-
sion to humans, have intensified concern over the emer-
gence of a novel strain of influenza with pandemic
potential. Three influenza pandemics occurred during the
20th century, with varying degrees of severity; outcomes
ranged from the high levels of illness and death observed
during the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic (estimates of deaths
range from 20 to 100 million [1]) to the much lower levels
observed during the pandemics of 1957 and 1968 (≈1 mil-
lion deaths each [2]). While recognizing that the character-
istics of future influenza pandemics are difficult to predict,
the World Health Organization (WHO) has recommended
that nations prepare pandemic contingency plans (3).
Several have been drafted, and some have been published
(4–7), although all are subject to continuous refinement.
Surveillance, on both a local and global scale, will enable
policy makers and practitioners to act during the early
phases of a pandemic. However, the likely rapid global
spread of a pandemic strain will limit the time available to
implement appropriate mitigating strategies, and preemp-
tive contingency planning is needed.
A number of intervention strategies can reduce the
impact of influenza pandemics. During interpandemic
years, influenza vaccination is used to reduce deaths and
disease. However, vaccine is unlikely to be available in
time or in sufficient quantities for use during a pandemic
(8,9). Other, nontherapeutic, disease control options may
be used, such as those used during the outbreak of severe
acute respiratory syndrome (10). 
However, 2 groups of antiviral drugs are available for
the treatment and prophylaxis of influenza. These are the
adamantanes (amantadine and rimantadine) and the neu-
raminidase inhibitors (oseltamivir and zanamivir). The
adamantanes may be effective against pandemic strains,
but concern exists about adverse reactions and the devel-
opment of antiviral resistance. Resistance to amantadine
has been demonstrated in a number of avian H5 strains
(11) and its use for treatment of influenza is not recom-
mended (12).
The neuraminidase inhibitors (NIs) reduce the period of
symptomatic illness from both influenza A and B viruses
(13) and both are recommended for use in the United
Kingdom for treatment of at-risk adults who are able to
begin treatment within 48 hours of onset of symptoms.
Oseltamivir is also recommended for the treatment of at-
risk children >12 months of age (12). The development of
antiviral resistance has been reported for NIs, particularly
related to oseltamivir use in children (14), although current
evidence suggests that resistant strains are pathogenically
weakened (15). The use of NIs for treatment of pandemic
influenza remains an option since they may improve indi-
vidual disease outcomes and the effect of the disease in the
population.
An influenza pandemic is likely to increase demands on
healthcare providers, especially in hospitals. Except in
Japan, current levels of NI use are low. Any strategy
involving NI use would require stockpiles of these drugs.
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Birmingham, United KingdomThe potential use of antiviral agents for prophylaxis has
been investigated elsewhere and may be of greatest use in
the earliest phases of a pandemic to retard the spread of the
virus (16,17). Earlier pandemic influenza modeling studies
have also focused on the economic effect of vaccination
(18) and the use of NI prophylaxis for disease control (19).
We assessed the potential effect of using NIs for treatment
on the estimated number of influenza-related hospitaliza-
tions likely to occur during a pandemic. Unlike in previous
studies (20), we have also taken into account the reduction
in infectivity that antiviral treatment may have on commu-
nity transmission. 
Methods
Our models focused on using NIs to treat different age
and risk groups and the potential effects treatment might
have on influenza hospitalizations. These effects have been
quantified by using the mathematical model described in
the online Appendix (available from http://www.cdc.gov/
ncdod/EID/vol11no09/04-1344_app.htm). The length of
the latent, noninfectious period was assumed to be 2 days
(19), and the infectious period was assumed to be 4 days
(19,21). Hospitalization rates for the baseline scenario
were calculated by using data from interpandemic influen-
za and are given for different and age risk groups (Table 1).
To be effective, NI treatment must be administered
within 48 hours of symptom onset. The efficacy of NI
treatment appears to prevent 50% of hospitalizations, mir-
roring efficacy rates against developing complications; this
efficacy rate is approximately the same for oseltamivir and
zanamivir (13). Symptoms were also reduced by ≈1.5
days; treatment was assumed to produce the same decrease
in the infectious period. 
The population was stratified as for seasonal influenza;
persons were considered to be either at high risk for severe
outcome or at low risk (22). The at-risk group included
those with chronic respiratory disease, chronic heart dis-
ease, chronic renal failure, diabetes mellitus, and immuno-
suppression; this group also included all persons living in
long-term care facilities, such as nursing homes (23), and
all those >65 years of age (24). 
Demographic data used in the model were based on
age-specific distribution of the UK population (Office for
National Statistics, http://www.statistics.gov.uk). The
model was used to simulate a number of scenarios, on the
basis of contingency plans and previous pandemics, to
investigate the effect of targeting NIs to different age and
risk groups on the expected number of hospitalizations
during a pandemic. 
Results 
The baseline scenario for this study was that advocat-
ed by WHO (3) and was also used previously by Meltzer
et al. (18). This scenario assumes a clinical attack rate, in
the absence of interventions, of 25% of the population,
which occurs during a single wave. Assuming that half of
infections are nonclinical or asymptomatic (i.e., a sero-
logic attack rate across the population of 50%) (25), a
value for the basic reproduction number, R0, of 1.39 can
be calculated. When these parameters are used in the
model in the online Appendix, the effect of different-sized
antiviral stockpiles on the overall clinical attack rate can
be estimated.
The outputs from the first set of simulations are shown
in Figure 1. The baseline scenario is shown alongside a
range of other clinical attack rates (20%–40%) (i.e., vary-
ing R0 from 1.28 to 2.0) in the absence of interventions.
For these scenarios, antiviral treatment is assumed to be
possible within 48 hours of onset for all symptomatic
patients until the stockpile is exhausted, with the exception
of those <1 year of age, who are not treated at any stage
(treatment for this age group is contraindicated [12]). The
points on the curves in Figure 1, where the gradients
change from vertical to horizontal, indicate the points at
which the stockpile is sufficient to treat all patients;
increasing the stockpile size would produce no additional
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Figure 1. Estimated impact of different sizes of antiviral stockpiles
on the number of clinical cases at the end of the pandemic.
Depicted are clinical attack rates before interventions of 20%,
25%, 30%, 35%, and 40%, with corresponding values for the basic
reproduction number (R0) of 1.28, 1.39, 1.53, 1.72, and 2.0
respectively. The precipitous decreases observed with the 20%
and 25% attack rates result at the points at which the stockpile
becomes large enough to last long enough to prevent a recrudes-
cence of the epidemic by suppressing the effective reproduction
number.benefit and would therefore result in a surplus of antiviral
treatments. 
For the baseline scenario, a stockpile large enough to
treat 12% of the population (i.e., a 12% stockpile) would
be sufficient to treat all patients, even if the clinical attack
rate in the absence of treatment is 25%. This difference is
due to a reduction in the effective reproduction number of
the disease, Rε, caused by shortening the infectious period
of those treated by 1.5 days. Across the different attack
rates, stockpiles sufficient to treat <1% of the population
are unlikely to result in major changes to disease dynam-
ics. Outputs are most sensitive to the clinical attack rate
when the reduction in the infection period caused by treat-
ment is sufficient to bring Rε <1. When Rε is <1, the num-
ber of secondary cases produced by each person is <1, and
incidence, therefore, decreases. The value of Rε can be cal-
culated as
where S is the proportion of the population susceptible.
With treatment, this equation can be rewritten as 
where It is the decrease in the infectious period due to
treatment, Ip the infectious period, and cithe proportion of
infections in each of the different population subgroups, i,
that are treated. For the scenarios in Figure 1, It = 1.5 days,
Ip = 4.0 days and ci = 0.5 for all groups except those <1
year of age, who only constitute 1.1% of the population.
Therefore, the term within the brackets for this scenario
can be calculated as 0.81. At the start of the pandemic, S is
assumed to be 1; therefore, if R0 is <1.23, the outbreak can
be controlled by treating all patients. For pandemics in
which  R0 is >1.23, depletion of susceptible persons
through infection is also required before Rε decreases to
<1, which is equivalent to S = (0.81R0) – 1.
The effect of different treatment strategies on hospital-
ization rates was generated from the baseline scenario:
treating all patients, only at-risk groups, only children and
the elderly (1–14 and >65 years of age), and only the
working population (15–64 years of age). These scenarios
were of potential interest to public health planners; outputs
are shown in Figure 2. Given a large enough stockpile, the
best option to minimize hospitalizations would be to treat
all patients; for this scenario, a 12% antiviral coverage
would reduce hospitalizations by up to 77%. An alternative
strategy of treating the whole working population reduces
the hospitalization rate by up to 40% but requires a similar
antiviral stockpile size, and treating the working popula-
tion consistently fails to reduce the number of hospitaliza-
tions below the number that would be expected if everyone
were treated, regardless of stockpile size. This increase is
because the hospitalization rate for the working population
is less than the average in the population and also because
treating a smaller proportion of the population has less
effect on the overall transmission rate. For stockpile sizes
only large enough to treat <5% of the population, the best
strategy would be to treat at-risk groups; this strategy is
also best for stockpile sizes up to 7%, with hospitalizations
at this level reduced by up to 45%. For stockpile sizes from
7% to 10%, the best strategy is to treat children and the
elderly (reducing hospitalizations by up to 48%) and for
stockpile sizes >10%, to treat everyone. 
The optimum treatment strategy is therefore dependent
on treating those at highest risk for hospitalization. The
simulations for the baseline scenario were based on a uni-
form age-specific attack rate and on age- and risk-specific
hospitalization rates from interpandemic years because of
the uncertainty over the precise characteristics of a future
pandemic. Since the age-specific clinical attack rate has
varied between pandemics, we repeated the analysis
above, as far as possible, using the age-specific attack rates
from previous pandemics (26–28) (Table 2) for compari-
son with the baseline scenario. 
The 1957 UK pandemic began with imported cases in
July 1957; deaths peaked in November 1957, with a
reported overall clinical attack rate of 31% (26). The pro-
portion of infections resulting in clinical illness was calcu-
lated from a small serologic survey of general
practitioners; only 46% of the general practitioners sur-
veyed with a positive antibody titer actually had symptoms
(26). The serologic attack rate was calculated as 67%,
which would require R0 = 1.65. The epidemic curve that
this figure would generate is shown in Figure 3A, with the
curve scaled to fit the 1957 epidemic curve for deaths (26).
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Figure 2. Estimated number of hospitalizations per 100,000 popu-
lation when different antiviral treatment strategies are applied.
Baseline scenario is when the clinical attack rate in the absence of
interventions is 25% of the population. The only additional change from the baseline scenario is
the 1957 hospitalization rate, which was reported to be
188/100,000 population (26). Using the age-specific attack
rates for 1957 (Table 2) in the model, we scaled hospital-
ization rates to achieve an overall hospitalization rate of
188/100,000 (Table 3). 
The results (Figure 3B) show that a 20%–25% antiviral
stockpile would be sufficient to treat all patients during the
first wave, a figure that is larger than that seen for the base-
line scenario, as both the clinical and serologic clinical
attack rates were higher. However, qualitatively, the results
are similar in spite of the differences in attack rates
between different age groups. With a stockpile as large as
20%–25%, an estimated reduction in hospitalizations of
≈67% could be expected. As in the baseline scenario,
effective targeting of smaller stockpiles to at-risk groups
can also be used to produce large reductions in hospitaliza-
tion rates. For stockpiles <11%, the best strategy is to treat
those at risk, which results in a reduction of 36%. For
stockpiles sizes from 11% to 17%, the best strategy is to
treat the young and elderly, which results in a 39% reduc-
tion. The highest reduction from treating the working pop-
ulation is 31% and remains a suboptimal strategy for any
stockpile size. 
The implications of different treatment strategies on the
hospitalization rates with a 10% stockpile are shown in
Figure 3C. Strategies with larger proportions of the 10%
stockpile had the greatest effect on the epidemic, steadily
delaying, but not diminishing, the peak of hospitalizations.
Treating only the working population results in a 15%
decrease in hospitalizations, treating all patients results in
a 22% decrease, and treating children and the elderly a
32% reduction. With each of these strategies, the antiviral
stockpile is exhausted before the end of the pandemic,
whereas the fourth strategy of treating at-risk groups
reduces hospitalizations by 36% and only requires a 5%
stockpile. Therefore, treating those at risk is the most effi-
cient strategy, but further targeting may be considered to
avoid surplus treatments. 
The 1968 pandemic was characterized by 2 waves, the
first relatively small, occurring from February to April
1969; the larger wave occurred from November 1969 to
January 1970 (27). We predominately considered the sec-
ond wave. A confounding factor is that a proportion of the
population would have been immune because of the first
wave. Weighting age-specific clinical attack rates (Table 1)
by age-group sizes from census data, we calculated the
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Figure 3. A), Output from the model fitted to the first wave of the
1957 pandemic scaled to fit observations from the 1957 pandem-
ic (26). B), Estimated hospitalization rates from a simulated pan-
demic with available parameters from the 1957 pandemic, as
influenced by stockpile size and treatment strategy. C), Impact of
treatment strategy on the time course of hospitalizations when the
stockpile size is fixed at 10% of the population, the stockpile is
fixed at 25% of the population and all clinical cases are treated,
and when no treatment is administered. overall clinical attack rates for the first and second waves
to be 6% and 21%, respectively (27; Office for National
Statistics [http://www.statistics.gov.uk]). The serologic
attack rate was derived by fitting the model to the data for
the second wave from the Royal College of General
Practitioners (provided by Douglas Fleming; http://www.
rcgp.org.uk); we assumed a similar proportion of asympto-
matic cases in both waves. The fit of the model to the data
is shown in Figure 4A, from which is derived a 15% resid-
ual immunity from the first wave and a 65% serologic
attack rate for the second wave, which produces an effec-
tive reproduction number of 1.85 for the second wave. The
overall hospitalization rate for the second wave was report-
ed as 144 per 100,000 (29), and using the age-specific
attack rates for 1968 in Table 2, we adjusted the values in
Table 1 to fit this value.
The size of the stockpile required to treat all patients is
≈18% (which is relatively small compared to the 1957 pan-
demic because of the lower clinical attack rate), which
leads to fewer patients being treated and less reduction in
overall transmission. If all persons whose infections result-
ed in clinical illness (i.e., patients) were treated, the hospi-
talization rate would drop by ≈56% (Figure 4B). For the
1968 pandemic, the effects of the different antiviral target-
ing strategies were different than in the previous scenarios
as a result of the different age-specific attack rates, which
are shifted more towards the working population (Table 2).
Thus, relatively small stockpiles are required to treat either
the at-risk group or the young and elderly group (≈3% for
each group), since most patients are in the working popu-
lation and neither of these 2 groups. For stockpiles of up to
12%, treating the at-risk group is marginally better than
treating the young and the elderly (37% reduction in hos-
pitalization as opposed to 32%), and for stockpiles >12%,
treating all clinical patients would be the best strategy.
The effects of the different treatment strategies with a
10% stockpile are shown in Figure 4C. Hospitalizations
would drop by ≈29% if all patients were treated and by
16% if the working population were treated; both treat-
ment strategies would lead to the stockpiles’ being
exhausted. As above, treating those at risk would reduce
hospitalizations by 37%, whereas treating only children
and the elderly would reduce hospitalizations by 32% and
only require a 3% stockpile per group. Of these 4 strate-
gies, treating the at-risk groups is the most efficient, but
given surplus stockpile, further extension of the groups to
be targeted may be considered. 
The characteristics for the 1918 pandemic differ sub-
stantially from the other 2 in that 3 distinct waves occurred;
the age-specific attack rates were highest for those in their
teens, 20s, and 30s; and the mortality rates were higher (2).
In addition, age-specific attack rates and mortality rates
differed for each of the 3 waves (28). Modeling based on
the 1918 pandemic was therefore considerably less
straightforward than for the previous 2 pandemics, and an
approach was taken to fit the transmission model to each of
the 3 waves, separately. No cross-immunity was assumed
between different waves since studies suggested only weak
effects; indeed, some studies suggested greater susceptibil-
ity in the third wave if a person had had influenza in the
first pandemic wave (28). Clinical attack rates were calcu-
lated from reported weekly mortality data and clinical
case-fatality rates (28). Serologic attack rates were then fit-
ted separately to each of the curves (Figure 5), from which
values of R0 = 2.0, 1.55, and 1.7 were derived from each of
the respective waves. The estimate for the second wave is
lower than other estimates of ≈3 (30) derived from US
cities and is probably because our estimates were derived
from data from throughout England and Wales, thereby
incorporating spatial heterogeneity. 
Since hospitalization rates were not available for any of
the 3 waves, we considered the effect of antiviral treatment
on death. The potential efficacy of antiviral treatments in
preventing death between waves may have differed, but it
was assumed to provide 50% protection against death.
This estimate was based on the assumption that 50% pro-
tection from the more serious outcomes of influenza can be
translated to equivalent protection from death (20). 
A pandemic with the characteristics of that in 1918
would, without antiviral treatment, produce an estimated
number of deaths equivalent to ≈0.5% of the population
across all 3 waves. However, a 20% stockpile sufficient to
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reduction in deaths. With a smaller stockpile of 10%, the
reduction in deaths was only 17% because the stockpile
becomes exhausted during the second wave, before most
of the deaths occur (Figure 6). 
Discussion
The baseline scenario with an overall clinical attack
rate of 25%, as currently advised by WHO (3), is roughly
in accordance with data from previous pandemics. The
general conclusion from our study is that antiviral treat-
ments for 20% to 25% of the population are likely to be
sufficient to treat all patients for pandemics with character-
istics that have been observed to date. The size of the
stockpile required will depend on the clinical attack rate of
the pandemic and the R0 value.
However, with smaller stockpile sizes, substantial
reductions in hospitalizations can be achieved through tar-
geting. For the smallest stockpiles, the best strategy was to
treat conventional influenza at-risk groups. Treating the
young and elderly is only slightly less effective. Treating
the working population may have benefits beyond reduc-
ing hospitalizations, such as reducing illness-related
absenteeism, but it consistently fails to be the best strategy
for reducing hospitalizations. For large stockpiles, treating
all patients is consistently the best strategy in reducing
hospitalization and transmission. When all patients are
treated, the marginal effect of treatment on reduced trans-
mission increases with the number of patients treated, until
all patients have been treated. 
Further studies regarding the effects of antiviral treat-
ments would improve the robustness of the parameter esti-
mates. In particular, better estimates on the efficacy of NI
treatment against hospitalization and death rates for differ-
ent age and risk groups and estimates on the reduction in
the infectious period are required. Also, the issue of antivi-
ral resistance needs to be resolved since it could compro-
mise NI effectiveness. 
The scenarios above assume that clinical patients were
treated within 48 hours of onset of symptoms; however, in
reality, some cases will be diagnosed or reported too late,
and other patients will be administered drugs mistakenly.
To maximize the benefits of antiviral treatment, patients
should be strongly encouraged to seek treatment and treat-
ment should be supported by sound clinical judgment and
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Figure 4. A), Output from the model fitted to the second wave of the
1968 pandemic scaled to fit observations from general practitioners
(GPs) from the 1968 pandemic (29). B), Estimated hospitalization
rates from a simulated pandemic with available parameters from
the 1968 pandemic as influenced by stockpile size and treatment
strategy. C), Impact of treatment strategy on the time course of hos-
pitalizations when the stockpile size is fixed at 10% of the popula-
tion, the stockpile is fixed at 25% of the population and all clinical
cases are treated, and when no treatment is administered.
Figure 5. Clinical cases per week estimated by using the clinical
case-fatality rates and weekly mortality statistics for the 1918 pan-
demic and by fitting the basic reproduction number (R0) to data
from each of the waves by using the transmission model (28).diagnostic capability. If high levels of treatment are not
achievable, disproportionately higher hospitalization rates
than those calculated here would ensue. In addition, iden-
tifying groups with higher transmission rates for targeting
treatment would result in greater reductions in transmis-
sion than reported here.  
Assessments will need to be recalculated in the earliest
phases of a pandemic with real-time data to confirm or
update the assumptions used and ensure that the model
parameters are appropriate. Therefore, were a pandemic to
occur, intensive analysis of its dynamics would be required
at its start. 
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